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The paper presents an analysis of cooperative investment decision based on the coalition
theoretical framework (Staatz 1983, 1987, 1989). According to this framework, cooperatives can
be considered as coalitions of groups with different interests. The behavior of any cooperative is
determined by the interaction of its many groups (different types of farmers, managers, lenders,
input suppliers, buyers, etc.) with different objectives. The group that can impose its will on the
coalition will determine the cooperative’s strategy. The other parties may accept this leadership,
leave the cooperative or try to use their bargaining power to modify the final outcome.
The paper discusses the impact of group bargaining on cooperatives’ decision process. In
particular, the paper addresses the issues related to the consequences of members’ heterogeneity
on cooperative efficiency. The proposed model utilizes tools from financial theory already
successfully applied in the literature (Peterson 1992, Hendrikse 1998) providing a more detailed
insight into the determinants of the cooperative decision process. The paper shows that
cooperatives evaluate investments differently from IOFs due to the unique characteristics of their
patrons compared to other types of investors. These characteristics raise the transaction costs of
                                               
1 Carlo Russo <russocar@msu.edu> is a graduate student at the University of Cassino (Italy), Dave Weatherspoon
<weathe42@msu.edu> and H. Christopher Peterson <peters17@msu.edu> are Assistant and Associate Professor at
Michigan State University, respectively.
Copyright © 2000 by Carlo Russo, Dave Weatherspoon, and H. Christopher Peterson.  All rights reserved.
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this
copyright notice appears on all such copies.2
the cooperative decision process making internal coordination more difficult. The point will be
shown through the following process:
1.  A model is set up by determining the assumptions and identifying the studied investment
decision. (Section 2)
2.  The cooperative members’ evaluation criterion is described. (Sections 3 and 5)
3.  This criterion is compared with IOF shareholders’. (Section 4)
4.  The implications of the differences are analyzed. (Section 6)
2. The Model.
The model describes members’ behavior and the cooperative decision process by imposing the
following assumptions to a general net present value (NPV) approach (Brealey and Myers 1996):
1.  Members’ objectives. Members’ goal is the maximization of the Net Present Value (NPVi) of
their personal investment in the cooperative.
2.  Independent evaluation of investment projects. Each member evaluates each investment
project independently. This assumption postulates that a member’ evaluation is not
influenced neither by the other members or other investment opportunities.
3.  Exit option. If the cooperative accepts an investment so that NPVi <-qi, the member will
abandon the cooperative. In the equation, NPVi is the net present value of the member’s
investment in the cooperative and qi is the quasi rent value of the member’s assets. The quasi-
rent value is defined as the difference between the value of the member’s assets if used in the
transaction with the cooperative and the their value if used in the next best transaction. Thus,
the quasi-rent value can be expressed as the loss in wealth that the member would incur if3
he/she left the cooperative. If -qi < NPV < 0, the member will not support the project (for
example, he/she might vote contrary) but he/she will not leave the cooperative.
4.  Open membership. Any producer can become a cooperative member simply by paying an
equity share at face value. Although additional costs may be charged to members to finance
cooperatives’ investments, membership is achieved simply by paying an equity share at
nominal value. As a consequence, members leaving the cooperative can only have back their
investment at face value because they cannot sell the share on the market at a higher price.
5.  All costs and benefits received or allocated by the cooperative can be expressed in economic
values.
6.  Restriction on cost and benefit allocation rules. Cost and benefit may be allocated among the
cooperative groups only according to two non mutually exclusive criteria: either
proportionally to equity share or proportionally to patronage.
2
7.   Separation of the farm production decisions. The evaluation of the cooperative’s
investments does not affect the members’ production decision for their farm. This assumes
that farmers would produce the same goods even if they were not cooperative members and it
implies the existence of alternative marketing channel for patrons’ products. Also, this
assumption postulates that the cooperative investment requires no intermediate investment
because members are not required to adjust their production to invest in the cooperative. This
assumption, together with the definition of total value, allows us to focus the analysis on the
pure financial decision of the cooperative investment.
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8.  No option value of the investment. The farmers do not gain any value by postponing the
investment. This assumption postulates that the benefits of waiting (i.e. avoiding a possible
loss) are offset by the costs (i.e. the missed cash flows).
9.  No taxation. The cooperative profits are assumed tax-free.
10. No bankruptcy. The possibility of bankruptcy is not considered in the model.
Now, assume that the cooperative is considering an investment with the characteristics
summarized in equation [1]. The study question is to determine if the cooperative should accept

















NPVC is the net present value of the investment calculated according a standard CAPM
technique.
N is the horizon of the investment;
Mt represents the “total value” produced by the cooperative in the year t. The “total value” is
the sum of all the benefits produced by the cooperative to the members plus the
cooperative net income (Staatz 1989). It may include price differentials, services,
cooperative profits, patronage or income retention, etc.
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, where kw is the interest rate calculated according to the Weighted Average Cost of
Capital  technique, Rt is the sum of the total value produced by the cooperative (Mt) and the interest expenses and I
is the total cost of the project including debts. The equation [1] takes into account the effect of the leverage through
the evaluation process of the interest rate kc.5
E0 is the value of equity required by the investment;
kc represents the interest rate to be used in the discount process. kc is calculated according
the usual Capital Asset Price Model (CAPM)  formula: kc = k0+(km-k0)bL, where k0 is the
return of the risk free assets, km is the return of the market portfolio and  bL is the beta
coefficient for the cooperative, given the specific leverage level
4 (Sharpe 1964, Lintner
1965). It must be pointed out that, according to the CAPM framework, kc is independent
from members’ preferences.
Financial theory states that, under the condition of fully diversified investors, the project
described in equation [1] should be accepted because it maximizes the value of the present
wealth of the investors (Brealey and Myers 1996). In this paper, the proposed financial model
will show that this rule does not hold for cooperatives. Actually, in these organizations, the
members’ wealth maximization is achieved through different decision criteria. To prove this
point, section 3 describes the evaluation process of the project from the members’ point of view.
3. Cooperative Members’ Investment Evaluation Criteria
Given the hypothesis of the model, the evaluation of the i
th member of the investment project
described in equation [1] can be model by equation [2]. The equation illustrates the decision
process of a farmer who is already a member of the cooperative and must decide if he/she should
support the initiative or not. As assumed, the member will support the project if NPVi>0, will
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covariance of the return of the market portfolio and the cooperative returns, divided by the expected variance of the
market portfolio.6
oppose the project if NPVi<0 (he/she will vote contrary) and will leave the cooperative only if
NPVi<-qi (the quasi-rent value of the investments).






t it t t i t





M )p w (1 M s w
NPV

















in which the present value of the cash flows obtained by the member (represented by the
summation value) is compared with the value of the required individual equity investment.
Specifically:
wt si Mt + (1-wt) pit Mt  represents the total cash flows obtained by the member in the year t. The
value is calculate by multiplying the total value produced by the cooperative (Mt) by a
series of parameters representing the rules for benefit allocation and the individual
characteristics of the member. In particular:
wt is the share of total value allocated among members in proportion to the equity
share in the year t,
si is the equity share of the i
th member (constant across time by assumption).
1-wt is the share of total value allocated among members in proportion to patronage in
year t,
pit is the share of total patronage delivered by the member in year t.
Hi represent the temporal horizon for the member, with Hi=min (investment horizon N,
number of years the member expects to be patron of the cooperative),
wt0siE0+(1-wt0)pit0E0  is the member’s initial equity investment: the wt0 percentage of the cost of
the investment (E) is allocated among the members in proportion to the equity share (si),
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is the present value of the equity investment that the member
receives back at the moment he/she leaves the cooperative (t = Hi). The value is
discounted at the risk free rate, given the no bankruptcy assumption.
ki represent the interest rate used by the member in his/her decision process. The formal
evaluation of the coefficient is discussed in section 5. For now, it is sufficient to state that
it is determined by the members’ preferences and it may be different from kc.
Equation [2] describes individual members’ evaluation of the cooperative project. It results in
two important preliminary conclusions. First, individual patrons can have different evaluations of
the investment: a project acceptable for the i
th member is not necessarily acceptable for the j
th
member (NPVi¹NPVj  ; with i¹j.). Second, in a cooperative, an investment with the
characteristics described in equation [1] is not necessarily acceptable for every member.
(NPVC>0 does not imply that NPVi>0 or NPVi>-qi).
These results are determined by three factors:
·  Difference in the investment horizons (Hi < N and, also, Hi not necessarily equal to Hj, with
i¹j). Members may plan to stop patronizing the cooperative in different times and possibly
before year N.  In this case, members may oppose a positive NPV project if they do not plan
to patronize the cooperative for a time period sufficient to gain enough returns from the
investment to cover the initial expenses (Vitaliano, 1983). This issue is a direct consequence
of the open membership of the cooperative. The absence of secondary markets for
cooperative shares consequential to the application of this principle prevents member from
recovering the present value of the future cash flows through the share selling price;8
·  Multiplicity of rules for cost and benefit allocation. Combination of pit, si, wt, and pt0, such
that the member bears a share of cost greater than his/her benefit share. The equation shows
that members consider the dynamics of the personal interaction with the cooperative in the
evaluation process, which usually differs across patrons. Specifically, members that plan to
increase their share of patronage (pit) over time should be more favorable to the investment,
while members that plan to reduce their patronage are more likely to have a negative
evaluation. Base capital plans usually are able to manage this problem and they can be
included in the model by imposing specific relations between the parameters pit, si, wt, and
pt0.
·  Diversity in the opportunity cost of money for members (ki ¹kj¹ kc). Members may apply
different interest rates in their individual investment evaluation. This condition will be
formally discussed in section 5.
4. Comparison with IOF Shareholders’ Evaluation Criteria.
In a cooperative, members may have different evaluations and their appraisal of the investment
may diverge from the classical NPV rule presented in equation [1]. Instead, shareholders of IOFs
are expected to have more consistent evaluations. This statement can be supported as follows.
From the formula [2], assuming that wt = wt0 =1 (all the value is distributed in proportion to
equity shares owned) and that the shareholders leaving the IOFs receive a market price VH for
their shares, we have the following equation representing the evaluation of the investment for the
s
























Where VH is the salvage value of the investment at time Hs, Mt is the total additional value
produced for the owners by the firm and ks is the interest rate determined according the standard
CAPM method.
Under the assumption that the market price for the equity share at time Hs is based on the NPV of
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The equations [4a] and [4b] show that, in a IOF, under the condition of fully diversified
investors, the general NPV rule leads to the maximization of the present value of each
shareholder’s wealth. Then, shareholders’ evaluations are expected to be consistent with each
other and with the general NPV rule.
In other words, if equation [1] holds for the firm, it holds for each individual IOF investor. No
bargaining process among investors is necessary in investment decision making. This is not true
for a cooperative. Equation [1] vs. equation [2] implies that the cooperative decision process is
expected to have higher transaction costs because of the divergent evaluations of the members.
In a cooperative, a bargaining activity is necessary among the members in order to choose the
proper course of action and to determine possible compensation for members with divergent
evaluations. This process is superfluous in the IOFs, given the homogeneity of shareholders’
evaluations.10
The consequences of this point will be fully analyzed in section 6, but first the factors
influencing the determination of the discount rate for cooperative members will be discussed. In
fact, the results achieved in this section assumed that the interest rate applied by cooperative
members in their evaluation is influenced by individual preferences. The next section provides
the formal derivation of this statement and discusses some of the implications.
5. Members’ Required Returns and Cooperative Investment Evaluation
The determination of the interest rate used by members in their decision process may be derived
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Et-1  is an operator representing the expectation conditional on information available at t-1
y
c
t represent the risk premium on the evaluated asset c
U’ and U” are the first and second derivatives of a concave utility function
covt-1 is the covariance operator conditional on information available at t-1
Wt is the investor wealth.
Assuming that the investor owns the market portfolio,
5 the equation [5] leads to the CAPM
determination of the interest rate used in equation  [1]. However, Murray (1983) and Condon and
Vitaliano (1983) argued that patrons of cooperative are unlikely to have a diversified portfolio
given the relevance of their farm investments. Hanson and Myers (1995) stressed that farmers11
usually “do not hold diversified portfolios, preferring to concentrate most of their assets in on-
farm investments and less risky financial investments such as treasury bonds and certificates of
deposit.” Given these studies, the market portfolio hypothesis appears not applicable to
cooperative patrons and a limited portfolio approach is required. Then, assuming that the
patrons’ investment portfolio includes only the farm operation, the participation in the





















t-1 is the investment share in
the farm operation and in the cooperative, respectively. Then by substituting the equation [6] into
the [5] it is possible to derive the expected return for the member’s participation in the
cooperative.
() () []
() [] () ( ) [] 1 t
c












1 t y var x y , y cov x
W U E
W U E







Then, ki used in equation [2] can be defined as k0+Et-1(y
c
t) and it represent the return of the
investment required by the i
th member, conditional to the a priori information about the project
                                                                                                                                                      
5 The market portfolio is a combination of asset so diversified that the specific risk of the single investment does not
influence the variance of the total returns of the portfolio.
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0 and that r
0 is constant (being risk-free), we have:
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(i.e. available at time=t-1),
7 The result is consistent with the financial literature about required
returns in presence of non diversifiable assets (Mather, 1972).
The equation stresses the two main strategies a cooperative may implement to produce benefits
for the members: creation of differential returns and risk management (Peterson and Anderson
1996). The dichotomy is pointed out by the fact that a member, for a given level of risk aversion,
will accept lower differential returns if they are negatively correlated with the farm returns,
reducing the overall risk level of the patron’s operations.
The formula shows that required return of the cooperative investment for a patron with a limited
portfolio depends on:
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·  the expected variance of the cooperative returns
·  the expected covariance between the cooperative and the farm operation returns
·  the relative risk aversion of the farmer represented by the coefficient  () []








The required return from the cooperative participation depends on individual and personal
preferences of the members and the characteristics of his/her farm. In the coalition framework,
                                               
7 In the formula [2] is implicitly assumed constant across time, however the formula [7] shows that that the model
allows for a variable interest rate, given the variability of the farmers’ portfolio, of their preference and of the value
of the risk-free interest rate.13
this implies the possibilities of different groups within the members characterized by different
evaluations of the project due to differences in the applied interest rate.
6. Consequences for the Cooperative’s Investment Decisions.
The heterogeneity of the required returns for members has major implications in the decision
processes of cooperatives. In fact, given the differences between the members’ required returns,
an acceptable investment should be able to grant at least the following return, which represent
the average of members’ individual required returns weighted with their percent claim on the
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where T is the number of members; ai is the percent share of total value that a member can
claim.
8 Then, kw is the required return for a cooperative investment. However, the application of
the formula [8] in the decision processes is subjected to two conditions. First, information
regarding members’ farm characteristics and their preferences (risk aversion) must be known.
Second, the cooperative must be able to discriminate perfectly in the remuneration of patronage.
In fact, equation [8] assumes that the cooperative could give to each member exactly the
individual minimum required return (ki). If the cooperative cannot discriminate then the
members with higher risk aversion or higher covariance between the farm and the cooperative
returns will receive a lower surplus or will suffer a deficit.
9 A cooperative not able to
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cooperatives’ investment evaluation is expected to vary across time non only because of the possible change in the
risk-free returns and in the market risk premium but also because of the changes in the dynamics of the relationships
between members and the cooperative.
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discriminate has to adopt a fixed interest rate k
* such as that a target percentage of member will
be satisfied. For example, if the goal is to satisfy of all patrons then k
* = max(ki).
The concept can be graphically illustrated through the notion of the required return curve (RRC)
which is determined by calculating the return of the investment able to satisfy the target
percentage of members in a non discriminating cooperative. Given equation [5], the shape of the
RRC is determined by each member’s risk aversion, portfolio composition and covariance
between the returns of the farm and the cooperative. The figure 3.1 illustrates two examples of
RRC in the case of non discriminating cooperatives. In figure 3.1, kc represents the internal rate
of return (IRR) of the cooperative’s investment described in equation [1], k
*(50%) is the return
able to satisfy at least 50% of the members. Assuming democratic rules in the cooperative (one
vote for each member and equidistribution of the contractual power), we have that an investment
will be approved by the members if it grants a return higher than k
*(50%). It must be pointed out
that the return on investment must be adjusted to take into account the possible exit of members
due to losses higher than the quasi rent value of the assets, in the case the project is approved.15
Figure 3.1: Influence of the Members’ Required Returns on the Cooperative’s Investment
Decisions
Given an investment with IRR=kc, Coop. A will accept it, while Coop. B
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According to formula [7], members of cooperative A may be characterized by low risk aversion,
low covariance of farm and cooperative returns, high incidence of the risk free asset in the
farmers’ portfolio. In this case, the cooperative may accept investments that present a negative
value according to the general NPV rule if their returns are actually higher than k
*(50%)A.
10 On
the contrary, cooperative B (where members may have high risk aversion, high covariance of
farm and cooperative returns, low incidence of the risk free asset in the farmers’ portfolio) may
reject investments even if they are acceptable according to the general NPV rule.16
In a non-perfectly discriminating cooperative, the difference between the expected return of the
investment and the return required by the member represents the member’s surplus or deficit.
This implies that every project with a return lower than max(ki) causes a transfer of wealth
between members. Thus, in a cooperative, the adoption of an efficient investment is not
necessarily a Pareto-efficient strategy. In order to avoid a Pareto-inefficient solution, two
conditions must be respected. First, financial compensation across members must be possible;
second the sum of individual surpluses for members must be at least equal to the sum of
individual deficits plus the transaction costs originated by the process of determining and paying
the necessary compensations.  According to the proposed model, a cooperative’s strategy may be
Pareto-efficient if it grants a return ke able to satisfy each member and cover the cost of the
negotiation and compensation processes, i.e. :
ke³kw + d [9]
where ke is the minimum return for a Pareto efficient strategy, kw is the required return for a
perfectly discriminating cooperative (equation [8]) and d is the increase in the required returns
due to the transaction costs in the compensation process.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the actual investment decision of the cooperative depends also
on the distribution of the negotiation power across members.
11 In fact, according to democratic
rules, a project should be approved or rejected if its Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is higher or
lower than k
*(50%). However, the effective negotiation power of minorities can determine the
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k
*(50%)A, member will approve the project even if it does not meet the general NPV rule (i.e. the market grants
higher returns for the same risk level).17
nature of the compensation and the value of d. If the IRR of the project is lower than ke, then full
compensation is not possible and the strategy of the cooperative is determined by the distribution
of negotiation power within the members.
Table 3.1 summarizes the results of the model. The two matrices report the outcomes of the
decision processes in the case that the expected return of the investment is able to satisfy the
majority of members (matrix A, IRR> k
*(50%)) and in the case that only a minority of members
is satisfied (matrix B, IRR< k
*(50%)). In the two situations, the minorities have different
interests. In case A, the minority is represented by the members with the higher required returns
who have interest in rejecting the project. In case B, the minority is represented by the members
with the lower required returns who may want to approve the investment. The matrices show that
the investment decisions change according to the distribution of the negotiation power depending
also on the returns offered by the project.
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on the whole coalition using any means, for example majority of votes in the meetings, control of the managers and
board of directors, control of the marketing channels, threat of exit, etc.18
Table 3.1: Cooperative Decision Matrices
Matrix A: Decision Matrix for a Cooperative Investment With IRR> k
*(50%)
negotiation power of minorities


























Matrix B: Decision Matrix for a Cooperative Investment With IRR< k
*(50%)
negotiation power of minorities
(members with lower required returns)
weak strong






















Then, in a cooperative the interest rate applied in the decision process is not based on the
assessment of the systematic risk but it depends on the rules for the benefit allocation and the
preference structure of members. In the model these conditions were represented by the
possibility of discrimination in return allocation, the farmers’ risk aversion and the covariance
between the returns of the farms and the cooperative.
7.  Transaction cost implications of the model.
The results of the analysis show the limits of the effectiveness of cooperative organizations.
According to the institutional approach, cooperatives are coordination tools useful to reduce the
                                               
12 In the determination of the negotiation power, a group’s threat of  leaving the cooperative (causing loss of profits
for the other groups) is a relevant factor (Staatz, 1983). In the proposed matrices, a strong power of the minorities19
transaction costs in the interaction between the farmers and the market (external transaction
costs). Through cooperatives, farmers are able to achieve better vertical coordination and reduce
their subjection to opportunistic behavior (Staatz 1989, Saccomandi 1992).
However this improved coordination is achieved at the expense of the efficiency of the decision
processes, which results in internal transaction costs. The financial analysis showed that the
internal transaction costs influence the determination of the required returns for the cooperative’s
investment evaluation and make the cooperative decision process inconsistent with an IOF under
similar circumstances.
The effectiveness of a cooperative organization is determined by the relative size of the two
typologies of transaction costs. If the benefits coming from the reduction of the external
transaction costs exceed the higher internal transaction costs (due to the bargaining process) then
a cooperative results in an efficient organization. The performance of the cooperative is
determined by the trade off between more costly internal coordination and improved external
coordination.
8. Conclusions.
The traditional financial models show that IOF investment decisions depend mostly on the
expected returns and on the risk of the project (Fisher 1930). The coalition framework and the
financial model proposed in this paper, showed that, in a cooperative, the decision is influenced
by additional factors. Specifically:
                                                                                                                                                      
assume that they can make a credible threat (due for example to low asset specificity) while the majority cannot20
·  factors related to members’ individual preferences. These factors include the members’ risk
aversion, the composition of their investment portfolio and the covariance of the farm
and cooperative returns.
·  institutional factors. Cooperative decisions are conditioned by the institutions determining
the rules for the bargaining process among the coalitions’ groups. Examples of these
factors are the voting rules, the mechanisms for the elections of the directors and their
attributions.
·  distribution of the bargaining power across members. The financial model shows that
members may have different evaluations of the project and the application of the
compensation principle proposed by the Coase Theorem may be costly. Thus,
members’ power within the cooperative may determine the emergent strategy.
The additional factors influencing members’ investment evaluations invalidate the general NPV
rule applied by IOFs. However, the transaction cost approach shows that potentially higher
internal transaction costs (due to members’ heterogeneity) do not imply an absolute competitive
disadvantage with respect to other organizations: the potential inefficiency of the decision
process may be compensated by a more effective external coordination.
Finally, the model presented in this paper raises several issues for further research. In this paper,
the focus was on members. The coalition framework stresses the relevance of other groups such
as managers or the board of directors. A complete description of the cooperative decision
processes should include an analysis of the influence of these groups on the strategies. The
                                                                                                                                                      
(high asset specificity).21
problem is particularly relevant because of the heterogeneity of the objectives of the members
that makes the determination of the incentive structure for managers and directors more difficult.
Also, the model utilizes strong assumptions. Particularly, the assumptions of independent
evaluation of investments, no option value and of independence of the farm production decisions
limit the application of the model. The introduction of real options techniques may be used to
overcome these problems.22
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